The State of Russian-Israeli Relations

An analysis by Robert O. Freedman, from the Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs

Russia has a number of interests in Israel. First, on the economic front, there is extensive trade which crossed the $500 million mark in 1995 (although it would later dip because of Russia's 1998 economic crisis), making Israel Russia's second leading trade partner in the Middle East after Turkey. Second, on the diplomatic front, a close relationship with Israel enables Russia to play, or appear to play, a major role in the Arab-Israeli peace process. Third, with almost 1,000,000 Russian-speaking Jews now living in Israel, Israel has the largest Russian-speaking diaspora outside the former Soviet Union, and this has led to very significant ties in the areas of cultural exchange and tourism. The fourth major interest is a military-technical one as the Russian military-industrial complex has expressed increasing interest in co-producing military aircraft with Israel, especially since many of the workers in Israel's aircraft industry are former citizens of the Soviet Union with experience in the Soviet military-industrial complex.

From the Israeli point of view, there are four central interests in relations with Russia. The first is to maintain the steady flow of immigration, which has provided Israel with a large number of scientists and engineers. The second is to prevent the export of nuclear weapons or nuclear materials to Israel's Middle East enemies, including Libya, Iran, and Iraq. The third goal is to develop trade relations with Russia, which supplies Israel with such products as uncut diamonds, metals, and timber. Russia is also the site of numerous joint enterprises begun by Israelis who had emigrated from the former Soviet Union. Finally, Israel hopes for at least an even-handed Russian diplomatic position in the Middle East and, if possible, Russian influence on its erstwhile ally, Syria, to be more flexible in reaching a peace agreement with Israel.

Several months after Barak's election, Putin became Russia's prime minister and quickly became deeply involved in the war against Chechnya -- a development that was to positively affect Russian-Israeli relations. While Putin was not to be responsive on the issue of arms to Iran, he was far more forthcoming in denouncing anti-Semitism than Yeltsin was (although he did not go as far as some Russian Jewish leaders wanted).

The issue of greatest importance to the relationship, at least from the Russian point of view, was Israeli support for Russian actions in Chechnya, with one Russian official stating that "Israel helps us break the Western information blockade of Russia over Chechnya." Israel also helped Russia by sending medical supplies to the victims of the Moscow apartment house bombings, claimed by Putin to have been perpetrated by the Chechens, and also gave medical treatment to wounded Russian soldiers.

Israeli help to Moscow over Chechnya was to pay diplomatic dividends when the Al-Aksa intifada broke out in late September 2000, when Putin took a very different position than did Primakov during similar crises in the 1996-1999 period. Unlike the Russian position under Primakov, Putin's Russia was not only evenhanded, he even seemed to tilt toward Israel as the crisis developed. Thus, then Secretary of the Russian Security Council Sergei Ivanov, who was later promoted to defense minister, linked the violence on the West Bank and Gaza to the Taliban's increased activities in Afghanistan and Central Asia, and to extremist activity in Chechnya, a position also espoused by Putin's adviser, Sergei Yastrzhembsky. The Russian Duma, unlike its anti-Israel and anti-Semitic predecessor that went out of office in December 1999, voted to blame not Israel but "extremist forces" for the escalation of the conflict.

Despite Putin's shift to an evenhanded position on the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, and Russia's important diplomatic, economic, and military ties with Israel, there are countervailing pressures in Moscow preventing too close a Russian-Israeli alignment. These include:

Pro-Arab elements in Russia's Foreign Ministry and in the increasingly influential secret police who hope to restore the close ties Moscow had in the Arab world in Soviet times.

Anti-Semitic forces who are also anti-Israel. They are primarily found in Russia's communist party and among Russia's ultra-nationalist politicians.

Russia's arms sales agency, Rosoboronoexport. The new arms sales agency has been given a high priority in Putin's efforts to revitalize the Russian economy. Indeed, Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Kasyanov has stated that the proceeds from the arms sales are to be invested in the development of new technologies for the economy. What makes this problematic for Israel is that Russian arms sales to Iran, an enemy of Israel, are already a matter of major concern. Should these be followed by arms sales to Syria (assuming Saudi Arabia is willing to pay for the arms -- a possibility if the intifada escalates and draws in Syrian forces), a deterioration in Russian-Israeli relations could well result. The situation would worsen even more if the UN sanctions on Iraq were lifted, or if Russia decided to break them unilaterally (both unlikely prospects at the current time), because in the past Moscow had been a major weapons supplier to Baghdad.

Russia's Muslim community. Approximately 20 percent of the Russian population, they are still rather quiescent politically. Nonetheless, the Russian leadership must take their views into consideration, given the dangers of radical Islam not only in Chechnya and elsewhere in the North Caucasus and the Russian Federation, but also in Central Asia.

Putin Blasts Dutch Chechen Stance

On a state visit, the Russian president took on the EU's pro-Chechen foreign policy:

Dutch Prime Minister Jan Peter Balkenende had raised concerns about respect for human rights in Chechnya in talks with Putin.

But Putin likened Russia's problems in the region to attacks by Islamic militants in Europe, such as the murder of Dutch filmmaker Theo van Gogh exactly a year ago by a Dutch-Moroccan.

"It was a terrible event that is, of course, a sign of a much broader problem called international terrorism," Putin said at a televised joint news conference with Balkenende in The Hague.

"We are fighting very cruel people -- beasts in the guise of human beings who do not and do not want to understand in what time and world they live. Our response must be equal to the threat they present to modern civilization," Putin said. . . .

. . . Putin said terrorists would seize upon any sign of weakness and chastised Western Europe for what he said were overblown concerns about abuses against Muslims in Russia.

"Sometimes it seems to me that certain European leaders want to be more Muslim than the Prophet Mohammed," Putin said.

"My opinion is that in the Caucasus and in Chechnya, we are protecting both our and your interests. If we allow terrorism to raise its head in one region, the same will happen in other regions of the world," he said.

Countries need to work together to combat terrorism effectively, Putin said, adding that cooperation with the Netherlands and the European Union on this issue was one topic that he and Balkenende had discussed.

Putin Lobbys for 2012 Moscow Olympics

This from The Moscow Times:

President Vladimir Putin threw his weight behind Moscow's underdog bid for the 2012 Olympics on Wednesday, saying Russia is a global sports power that deserves to host the games.

"I'm sure you will agree with me that our country is one of the greatest athletic powers in the world," Putin told the IOC evaluation panel in the ornate Catherine Hall at the Kremlin. "A constellation of athletic talent lives in Moscow."

Putin said Russia remembers the political and international situation in 1980, when Moscow hosted Summer Games boycotted by the United States after the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan.

"Thank God that time has passed," Putin said. "The world has changed. Russia itself has changed, but one thing has not changed, and that is the interest of the Russian people and their love of sports."

Personally, I think the Olympics would be good for Moscow and encourage further moderation by the government. The Russians would also improve Moscow, with a "river of sport," water taxis, new hotels, and so forth. The plans bandied about while we were living in Russia look good, and let's face it, Paris has plenty of tourist traps already, while Moscow needs some help to get up to world standards. The Olympics would make a nice present to the Russians--if Putin releases Khodorkovsky, for example.

The Russian government cares about its international image, and having thousands of foreign visitors will no doubt encourage Putin to be on his best behavior. Also, it would be a good way to ease Putin out of power into another high profile job--he might be able to become head of Russia's Olympics Committee (he's a judo champion, don't forget), travelling the world to improve Russia's image in preparation for 2012, instead of "president for life"...

Putin Meets the Press

Meanwhile, back in the Kremlin, Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin held a 3-hour press conference. You can read the full transcript here. Of particular interest to me was his answer to a question about Uzbekistan:

STEVEN GUTTERMAN (correspondent for the Associated Press, USA): During your presidency you said that Russia is a European country that shares European culture and values. But sometimes Russia supports certain opinions or a certain regime in the former Soviet Union which obviously does not share these values. For example, events in Andizhan and Russian support for Uzbekistan's actions during these events. Do you not think that these approaches are incompatible?

Thank you.

VLADIMIR PUTIN: I do not think that these approaches are incompatible, especially since we know better than you do what happened in Andizhan. And we know who trained the people who ignited the situation in Uzbekistan and in that city in particular, where they were trained, and how many of them were trained. This does not exclude the fact that there are a great many problems in Uzbekistan, but it does exclude the fact that we take an approach in which we oscillate, or in which we could allow ourselves to shake up the situation in that country.

You probably know what the Fergana valley is and you know how difficult the situation is there, the population's situation and their level of economic well-being. We do not need a second Afghanistan in Central Asian and we shall proceed very carefully. We do not need revolutions there, we need an evolution which will lead to establishing those values you spoke about, but that will not encourage explosions like the ones we faced in Andizhan.

Also interesting was Putin's analysis of the Hamas victory in Palestinian elections:

MOHAMMED AMRO (Al-Jazeera): Mr President!

After Hamas' victory in the Middle East there have been certain statements from the west threatening to stop or diminish the help they give the Palestinian population.

Will your position on this issue change? And do you agree with the opinion that what is happening now in the Middle East is the failure of American diplomacy?

Thank you.

VLADIMIR PUTIN: It is a big setback, an important setback for American efforts in the Middle East. A very serious setback.

I think that if we want to resolve these difficult global problems than we must only do so together and not invite the participants in the process to pull the chestnuts out of the fire, but rather sit down together and to listen to each other right from the beginning and to take corresponding decisions.

Our position concerning Hamas differs from the American and western European positions. The foreign ministry of the Russian Federation never declared that Hamas is a terrorist organization. But this does not mean that we approve and support everything that Hamas does and all the declarations that they have made recently. We think that it is one thing when this political force was the opposition and trying to get into power and we know that throughout the whole world very often the opposition makes very radical statements. It is another thing when it receives the people's vote of confidence and must make sure that the people who believed in this movement feel the positive results of their authorities' work. ves the people's vote of confidence and must make sure that the people who believed in this movement feel the positive results of their authorities' work. And for this it is necessary to leave behind the extremist positions, to recognize Israel's right to exist and to have relations with the international community.

We call on Hamas to do these things. In any case we would consider refusing to help the Palestinian people a mistake.

Of course, he spoke about the Russian-Ukranian gas showdown:

OLGA SOLOMONOVA (Trud newspaper): I have a question concerning Russian-Ukrainian relations in the gas sector.

It seems that everything had been resolved at the beginning of this year, that you agreed on everything. You met personally with Yushchenko. Everything seemed normal.

Now, as is well-known, Ukraine is once again starting to take gas outright and Gazprom is constantly increasing deliveries to Europe.

What is your impression of this situation?

VLADIMIR PUTIN: First of all I consider very positive the fact that we were able to agree with Ukrainian leadership on a common approach towards supplying Ukraine with Russian energy. It is positive both for our bilateral relations and for the energy situation in Europe and in the world.

And I consider that Ukrainian leadership took a courageous and correct step when it accepted these agreements. These agreements were a compromise and each party is satisfied with them. Along with this, you are correct. We agreed on everything, signed everything regarding prices, fixing prices, the volumes of deliveries. And despite all of these agreements and without any conflicts, we were faced with the situation in which a large amount of Russian gas is being siphoned off from the pipelines through which it is exported to Europe. During a cold period in Ukraine this amounted to 34-35 million cubic metres of gas per day. Gazprom wanted to remake these losses for western European consumers and unilaterally increased daily deliveries by 35 million. What happened next? Our Ukrainian partners continued to take 35 million daily in addition to the supplementary amount that Gazprom was delivering, that is 70 million cubic metres a day.

And now I would like to ask a question to those sceptics who didn't believe it was necessary to construct the Northern European Gas Pipeline under the Baltic Sea. Is this pipeline necessary to ensure a stable gas supply to western Europe or not? Whoever talks about this theme in the future must reflect on whose interests they have at heart, the interests of their own population or other interests that are difficult to justify. 

We expect that we shall be able to find an equilibrium in our relations with our Ukrainian partners. I am happy about the fact that, in contrast to previous years, our Ukrainian partners said straight out that they were taking this gas, there was no tentative to cover up, nor to distort the fact. It is important to us that we are paid for this gas according to the prices we agreed on. This can be done either at the end of February or in another way, seeing as the quantity of gas delivered to Ukraine, the quantity of Russian gas, is limited to 17 billion cubic metres a year. This means that at one point the total volume shall be determined and then we must agree on the new volume. But it is important that this is not hidden but discussed openly. I hope that these discussions will lead to a positive result.

The most Russian moment seemed to be this exchange with a reporter who covers the Russian automobile industry and asked to test drive the President's car:

FEDOR BYSTROV (Volga Press): ...And I have a second question if you do not consider it out of place: would it be possible to use your private car for a test drive? I think that many Russians would be interested to know what is in the President's car.
Well, using this opportunity, I would like to invite you to drive in a Togliatti.
VLADIMIR PUTIN: Thank you, thank you for the invitation.
Which car would you like to receive? (excitement in the room)
FEDOR. BYSTROV: A Volga.
VLADIMIR PUTIN: A Volga?
FEDOR BYSTROV: Yes, I would like to do an article on a Volga.
VLADIMIR PUTIN: Okay, fine, we agreed.

Like Putin, I'm surprised any reporter wants to test-drive a Volga . . .

An Open Letter to the G8 About Raoul Wallenberg

I guess Vladimir Putin and the G8 summit were busy with the Israel-Hezbollah war at the time, which could explain why I haven't seen any response to this request, or read any press coverage. Now I see that this Open Letter asking for information about the case of Raoul Wallenberg has been published on the website of the Raoul Wallenberg Foundation... Since I'm one of the signatories, I'm taking the liberty of reprinting the text here, in hopes that maybe it will help lead to some answers:

OPEN LETTER TO THE G8 SUMMIT

Fifty years after Nikita Khrushchev's famous speech condemning Stalin's crimes, full access to all documentation in Russian archives could finally solve the question of Swedish diplomat Raoul Wallenberg's fate.

St. Petersburg, historic residence of the Russian czars and President Vladimir Putin's political home base, has known ruthless power as well as enlightenment. Meticulously refurbished over the past decade, the city is ready at last to present itself to the world for the upcoming G8 meeting on July 15-17, a powerful symbol of the new Russia.

But a two weeks before the eight strongest industrial nations gather against this magnificent backdrop, the new Russia knows it has work to do. Despite President Putin's defiant stand at the "State-of-the-Nation" address last month, the mounting international criticism of the country's record on democracy and human rights is taking a toll. U.S. Senator John McCain has called for an outright boycott of the meeting and the Financial Times recently reported that if U.S. President George W. Bush attends the gathering, he may choose to publicly "snub" Putin.

Russia, for its part, is not sitting idly by. On May 1, the Financial Times reported in a front page article, that the Kremlin has hired one of the world's leading public relations firms, Ketchum, to polish its public image.

We suggest instead a simple thing President Putin can do that would secure Russia the admiration of the world.

Russia could make a historic gesture by finally presenting what it really knows about the fate of Swedish diplomat Raoul Wallenberg, who saved thousands of Hungarian Jews in World War II. Wallenberg was arrested in January 1945 by Soviet forces - in flagrant violation of the rules of diplomatic immunity and neutrality - and taken to Moscow where he disappeared. His fate and that of his Hungarian assistant, Vilmos Langfelder, remain unknown.

The Russian government claims Raoul Wallenberg died in Soviet captivity in 1947 but it has never provided conclusive proof for this assertion. President Putin has expressed his respect for Wallenberg's achievements while arguing that all direct evidence concerning Wallenberg's fate has been destroyed long ago. That claim is firmly rejected by almost all Wallenberg experts due to overwhelming evidence that Russia has withheld critical documentation.

A decision by President Putin to reveal the true circumstances around Raoul Wallenberg's disappearance would be a courageous act and would send a strong signal for greater openness, public accountability and respect for international law, including minority and individual rights. Sixty-one years after the event, no state secrets can possibly stand in the way of telling Wallenberg's family and the world what really happened to a compassionate and heroic man who is an honorary citizen of the United States, Canada, Israel and Australia.

Sweden, too, could use this opportunity for a bold move of its own. As a representative of the European Union, Sweden should invite to Russia Raoul Wallenberg's sister Nina Lagergren and his brother, Dr. Guy von Dardel, as special guests of the Swedish Prime Minister and the Swedish Embassy during the G8 meeting. Rather than constituting a provocation, such an invitation would underline the importance Sweden insists it attaches to solving the case.

The presence of Raoul Wallenberg's next of kin in St Petersburg or Moscow would offer them the opportunity to conduct meetings with Russian officials and to seek support from the international community. Russia could finally answer the seventeen still pending questions that were posed by the Swedish Working Group at the end of its official report from 2001 and that Sweden has made clear Russia needs to answer in full before any binding conclusions about Raoul Wallenberg's fate can be drawn. [All questions can be found at http://www.raoul-wallenberg.asso.fr]

Russia can then present the important documentation related to the Raoul Wallenberg case which is known to exist in Russian archives and which the family has repeatedly requested. Until now, Russia has refused access to what it broadly terms "operational material," but it simply has to allow a full review by Wallenberg experts and qualified historians, if a credible investigation is to take place.

There are three compelling reasons for requesting such a review:

1. The discovery of Raoul Wallenberg's personal belongings in Russian archives seventeen years ago raised fundamental questions. The material is the strongest indication to date that Wallenberg's personal and investigative file/s still exist today. More importantly, it may well be evidence that he lived longer: If Raoul Wallenberg died in 1947, his possessions and valuables should have been confiscated by the Soviet state within six months of his death. Instead, they were available in 1989 and, in a generous gesture, were returned to his family by Soviet authorities.

2. Just as critical are numerous witness testimonies, including that of a former female employee at Vladimir prison, where Wallenberg is reported to have been incarcerated at various times after 1947. From a series of different photographs, she repeatedly and consistently identified a picture of Raoul Wallenberg not previously published in the international press, directly associating his captivity in solitary confinement with the death of a Ukrainian prisoner in a nearby cell. The verification process for this and other testimonies was cut short in 2001 before it could be completed.

3. There is also important new information, outlined by the Deputy Director of Russia's 'Memorial' Society, Nikita Petrov, in his recent book, "The First Chairman of the KGB Ivan Serov," (Moscow/Materik, 2005). Petrov shows that after years of insistent denials by the Russian government, highly relevant information about Raoul Wallenberg's cellmate in Lefortovo prison in 1946/47, Willi Rödel, a German diplomat, survives today in Russian archival collections, as do important investigative files of other prisoners linked with the Wallenberg case. Despite repeated requests, these files were never made available to the Swedish-Russian Working Group during its ten year investigation (1991-2001).

It is now clear that Rödel was killed in October 1947, that his case was discussed at the highest levels of the Soviet government and that the Russians have known about this for decades. Yet, only a few documents were previously released, which stated that Rödel had died of natural causes.

If Russian officials as late as the 1990's chose to actively mislead investigators, how can we believe that they have told all they know and have on file about Raoul Wallenberg?

Petrov's and the previous findings all reinforce one central question: Is the flimsy documentation of Wallenberg's alleged death in July 1947 really due to destroyed or removed papers, and the wish to protect Soviet leaders who not only knew of but who had ordered Wallenberg's arrest? Or - since key documentation is preserved about the death of Wallenberg's cellmate and other foreign diplomats, - do we not have a formal death certificate or autopsy report for Raoul Wallenberg because he did not die at that time?

Sweden and other concerned countries, in particular the United States, have not effectively challenged Russia on these issues and there are no signs that they are vigorously demanding access to the withheld material. Sweden claims that the Raoul Wallenberg case remains very much an official item on the current Swedish-Russian agenda. Russia, however, clearly can do far more than it has done until now to solve the Wallenberg mystery. The current stalemate is therefore unacceptable.

For Russia it is time to lay the cards on the table: Did Raoul Wallenberg die in July 1947, and if so, how? Or did he live longer and if so, what happened to him?

President Putin rightfully points with pride to a 70 percent approval rating and other accomplishments, such as a steep drop in Russia's overall poverty rate. Democracy, he says, takes time. Mr. Putin certainly has the right to highlight the glaring contradictions and downright hypocrisy of other foreign leaders when it comes to telling the truth and maintaining respect for the rule of law. But this does not change the fact that without real information, accountability and law, no democracy can grow.

By finally presenting the truth about Raoul Wallenberg, who has become a symbol of humanitarian action, President Putin would let the world know where he stands. The PR experts at Ketchum will have a hard time matching that.

Argentina

Prof. Elena Cohen Imach [Psychologist and poet]
Ricardo A. Faerman [President, Confederación General Economica]
Dr. Benjamín Horacio Koltan [Psychologist]
The International Raoul Wallenberg Foundation
Ricardo Monner Sans - [Human Rights Lawyer]

Australia

Frank Vajda [Raoul Wallenberg Committee]
Jan Anger (son of collaborating Swedish diplomat Per Anger)
J. S. Dammery
Dr Daniel Talmont, Sydney Australia

Canada

Marcel Collet [Director]
Prof. Irwin Cotler [former Canadian Minister of Justice]
Jacques Coutour [Producer]
David Matas [Human Rights lawyer]
The Raoul Wallenberg International Movement for Humanity

Estonia

Mart Laar [Former Prime Minister of Estonia]

Finland

Pentti Peltoniemi [Journalist]

France

Louise von Dardel [Raoul Wallenberg's niece]
Marie Dupuy [Raoul Wallenberg's niece]

Germany

Susanne Berger [Independent expert to the Swedish-Russian Working Group
Christoph Gann [Author]
Wolfgang Kaleck [Human Rights Lawyer]
Dr. Andras Kain [President, Raoul Wallenberg Loge]
Eleonore Kius [Wallenberg expert and Human Rights activist]
Petra Isabel Schlagenhauf [Human Rights Lawyer]
Pastor Annemarie Werner [Vaterunser Kirche, Berlin]

Great Britain

John Le Carré
Gitta Sereny

Holland

Dr. Gerard Aalders [historian]

Hungary

Dr. Ferenc Orosz [Presidium member, The Raoul Wallenberg Association]

Israel

Casa Argentina en la Tierra Santa
Max Grunberg [Raoul Wallenberg Honorary Citizen Comittee]
Larry Pfeffer [Jerusalem Wallenberg Committee]
Malkiel Tenembaum [Casa Argentina en Jerusalem]
Yoav Tenembaum [Historian]
Solly Ganor, Holocaust survivor

Japan

Dr. Pamela Rotner Sakamoto, author and historian

Mexico

Dr. Renata von Hanffstengel, Director of the Institute for Intercultural
Research Mexico-Germany

South Africa

Tracey Petersen, Education Officer, Cape Town Holocaust Centre, 88 Hatfield Street, Cape Town, 8001, SOUTH AFRICA
Dr Ivor Shaskolsky, Cape Town, South Africa.

Sweden

Roger Älmeberg [Editor]
Maria Pia Boëthius [Historian]
Lena Einhorn [Holocaust researcher and author]
Prof. Stig Ekman [Historian]
Ingemar Karlsson [Editor and historian]
Prof. Georg Klein - [Scientist and author]
Gerald Nagler [Chairman of the Swedish Helsinki Committee for Human Rights]
Anders Pers [Former Editor-In-Chief of Vestmanlands Läns Tidning]
Arne Ruth [Former Editor-In-Chief of Dagens Nyheter]
Tuve Skånberg - [Member of Parliament]
Per Tistad [NIR]
Prof. Dennis Töllborg [University of Gothenburg]
Claire Wikholm - [Actress]

United States

The Angelo Roncalli International Committee
Charles Fenyvesi [Journalist]
Ari Kaplan [Independent expert to the Swedish-Russian Working Group]
Dr. Amy Knight [Historian]
Dr. William Korey [American Jewish Committee]
Prof. Mark Kramer [Harvard University, The Cold War History Project]
Prof. Marvin W. Makinen [Independent expert to the Swedish-Russian Working Group]
Susan Ellen Mesinai, Founder, ARK Project; Independent expert to the Swedish-Russian Working Group]
The Raoul Wallenberg Committee of the United States, Ltd.
Eric Saul, [Director, Visas for Life: The Righteous and Honorable Diplomats Project
Institute for the Study of Rescue and Altruism in the Holocaust]
Prof. Christopher Simpson [The American University]
Prof. Hugh J. Schwartzberg [Raoul Wallenberg Committee of Chicago]
Kate Wacz born Kadelburger, Budapest, Hungary, rescued by Raoul Wallenberg
Marissa Roth, family saved by Raoul Wallenberg
Knud Dyby, Danish Rescuer of Jews and others
William T. and Abigail Bingham Endicott (son-in-law and daughter of Diplomat Hiram Bingham IV)
GILBERTO BOSQUES TISTLER (Grandson of Mexican Ambassador Gilberto Bosques)
Rositta E. Kenigsberg, Daughter of a Holocaust Survivor, Executive Vice President, Holocaust Documentation & Education Center, Inc.
David Rubinson, Executive Producer: SUGIHARA Conspiracy of Kindness
Lawrence Baron, Nasatir Professor of Modern Jewish History, San Diego State University
Represenative Joel Judd, Colorado House District 5
Ferne Hassan, American Jewish Committee
Laurence Jarvik, Producer-Director, Who Shall Live and Who Shall Die?
Peter R. Rosenblatt (lawyer and former U.S. ambassador)
Alan and Sheila Granwell
Aaron and Courtney Cohen
Alexis Granwell
Marilyn Gilbert, Attorney At Law, Civil Rights Litigation
Steven T Geiger, of Palo Alto, CA, USA, Retired Engineer, saved by Carl Lutz in 1944
Dr. Wayne Grossman
Zoe Grossman
Klara Firestone - Founder and President of Second Generation of Los Angeles (Children of Holocaust Survivors) and community leader and activist
Renee Firestone - Holocaust Survivor, world famous Holocaust Lecturer, fashion designer, community leader and activist
Rabbi Irving Greenberg
Liebe Geft, Director of the Museum of Tolerance, Simon Wiesenthal Center, Los Angeles, California

Putin to Host Call-In TV Show

I watched Putin's call-in TV show when I lived in Tashkent in 2002. It was sort of a Christmas special, for what the Russians call "Novi God." Like Santa, Putin was making a list of who had been naughty and who had been nice.

It was just fascinating. We have nothing like it in the US. And I doubt George W. Bush's could pull off something like this. I wish we had something like it in the US. Putin sits at a table, with a file folder full of papers, and answers questions like a good government official should.

As in past years, the call-in show will be broadcast on state-run Channel One and Rossia television as well as on state-owned Mayak radio. Television cameras will be set up in cities across the country so that people "will get the chance to ask their president a question live" on the air, the Kremlin spokeswoman said.

In addition, the presidential administration is again opening a call center to collect additional questions and it will also be accepting questions by e-mail, she said.

A total of 1.53 million questions were submitted to the broadcast in 2003. Putin answered 68 over 2 1/2 hours.

Then, Putin cancelled the show last year while I was living in Moscow (his popularity was dropping). Now that he's at 70 percent public approval in the polls, maybe he feels more confident.

Not all the questions were friendly in 2002. People were concerned about their pensions and unpaid salaries, and not shy about it. There was even a question about bringing back the Tsar (Answer: Nyet!).

It is a cross between C-SPAN and a local "Ask the Mayor." There is also the idea that the unanswered questions might be forwarded to the right government bureaucrat for action. Two journalists, video hookups (one from a Russian military base Tajikistan), phone calls. For hours. Afterwards, almost all my Uzbek students who saw it were impressed by Putin (it was shown on Russian cable TV). So was I.

The Case For Putin (cont'd.)

Writing in Foreign Affairs, Nikolas K. Gvosdev argues that Putin knows what he is doing:

Putin and his advisers do not intend to recreate the old Soviet enterprises, top-heavy with management and burdened by inefficient central planning. Instead, they seem to want profitable companies that can generate a revenue stream for their shareholders-including the Russian state. What is emerging is state-directed capitalism, in which private owners play a role and have the opportunity to bank profits.

We are seeing in today's Russia the consolidation of a system of managed pluralism-in which the Kremlin sets the overall agenda, but with some room for political and economic competition and choice. Whether this is a disappointing direction depends on with whom you speak. Most Russians support Putin's vision of 'orderly' state-directed reform, looking to the center to reel in the power of the oligarchs and local bosses.

There is indeed a pronounced authoritarian streak in today's Russia. But there are also optimistic signs-the seeds of a middle class beginning to take root, the steady rise in the number of home-grown charities and other civil-society organizations-that point to a more democratic Russia emerging in the future.

Gvosdev points to the influence of a Russian academic, Vladimir Litvinenko, rector of the State Mining Institute in St. Petersburg, who has a theory of national control of natural resources which he says explains Putin's actions in the energy sector. Litvinenko is an advisor to Putin from his St. Petersburg days.

Persuasive, but still, I'd feel better if Putin let Khodorkovsky go.

The Case for Putin

Here's an interesting pro-Putin article The west gets Putin wrong that is worth thinking about. Mary Dejevsky makes some good points, namely that Putin is weaker than he looks, and far from being a dictator, is casting about trying to stay in power by playing factions off against each other. Still, the argument that things could be worse, and that there is no constituency for more reforms--while true--doesn't justify the kind of self-defeating overkill that Putin has engaged in with the Yukos affair, for example.

Who would want to go into business in Russia, if the government can just decide one day to put you out of business, on a whim? Especially since Yukos was by all accounts the best-run company in Russia. That is the chilling effect to outside investors that Putin needs to resolve as quickly as possible, by letting Khodorkovsky go. Until he does, Russia's international image will continue to suffer.

One thought would be for Putin to release Khodorkovsky before V-E Day celebrations, as a gift to Bush for attending.

Kommersant on the Death of Boris Yeltsin

At the president's residence, it seemed to me that the tragedy had occurred in those very rooms: everyone walked carefully, avoiding each other's eyes, and spoke in whispers, if they spoke at all. People mentioned that Boris Nikolayevich's heart had been bothering him for a week, and then he suddenly improved on Sunday. Just when everyone had breathed a sigh of relief, he suffered cardiac arrest. The doctors did everything they could: they managed to get his heart going again, but it soon stopped, this time forever. His allotted time was simply up. He was so worn out that he just had no chance. No chance, and there was nothing else that could be done.

Vladimir Putin decided to make an announcement about the death of Russia's first president. The text of the statement was his own, and he edited and corrected it several times. He considered the words to be so important for himself personally and for the country as a whole that he waited to write them down until he could gather his thoughts late yesterday evening.

Before then, he met with the president of Turkmenistan, whom he went out to meet in a dark suit and tie. Mr. Berdymukhammedov initially smiled at the Russian president, but as soon as he saw the expression on Mr. Putin's face, the smile slid from his lips. In my opinion, the Turkmen president did not immediately understand what was going on and labored for some time under the impression that Mr. Putin's condition was somehow his fault. The Russian president congratulated Mr. Berdymukhammedov unenthusiastically on his election to the post of president and declared that the relationship between Turkmenistan and Russia is going along "extremely well" and that "we have responded to your recent request to build another branch of the gas pipeline along the Caspian Sea." Then he clammed up.

"Thank you for your respect… We are grateful for your hospitality…" began the Turkmen president. "Our cooperation has historical, uh, roots… We will build our cooperation on, um, mutually beneficial terms…"

Obviously noticing that something was up, he let his voice trail off. It seemed that he was still uninformed about what had happened. When the journalists were leaving, Vladimir Putin quietly informed his colleague, "we suffered a great tragedy today."

The talks with the president of Turkmenistan were also very short, as was dinner with him.

At the same time, it was being decided what would be done with the president's address to the Federation Council, which was scheduled for April 25. When it became known that Boris Nikolayevich Yeltsin's family might schedule the funeral for Thursday, April 26, the Kremlin determined to go forward with the speech on Wednesday as planned, with the additional of a few extra phrases that would have the hall on its feet.

But then it was announced that the funeral would be on Wednesday, and the president's speech was immediately rescheduled.

There was no real doubt where final goodbyes would be said to Russia's first president: the Church of Christ the Savior, in the portion of the church dedicated to events of exceptional importance in the life of the church and of the country. Boris Yeltsin will be laid to rest in Novodevichy Cemetery.

An hour after the Turkmen president left, Vladimir Putin said his first words of farewell to Boris Yeltsin. In a televised speech to the nation, he also designated April 25 a national day of mourning.

"We knew Boris Nikolayevich as a courageous and also warm-hearted, sincere man," said Mr. Putin. "This was a straightforward and brave national leader… Boris Yeltsin took full responsibility on himself for everything that he advocated and strove for. For what he tried to do and did – for the sake of the country, for the sake of millions of Russians. All of Russia's woes and hardships, people's difficulties and woes, he unceasingly channeled through himself… And today I express my sincerest and deepest sympathies to [Yeltsin's widow] Naina Iosifovna and to Boris Nikolayevich's friends and relatives. We grieve together with you. We will do everything in our power to ensure that the memory of Boris Nikolayevich Yeltsin, his noble designs, his words 'take care of Russia' always serve as our moral and political compass… The person who brought an entire era into being has gone. A new democratic Russia was born – a free nation open to the world. Thanks to the will and direct initiative of Boris Yeltsin, a new constitution was adopted that acclaimed human rights as the highest value. It gave the people the opportunity to freely express their thoughts, to freely choose the powers-that-be in the country…"

Vladimir Putin's words oblige him to do the same.

Amb. Jack Matlock on Ukraine's Impact on Putin

http://jackmatlock.com/2014/03/obama’s-confrontation-over-ukraine-has-increased-putin’s-support-at-home/#more-640

I received the following comments on yesterday’s essay from a Russian-speaking American now resident in Moscow. They include some important points about Russian opinion and on the impact of the Ukrainian events on politics in Russia itself. Each of the points deserves a separate essay, but I wish to share them without delay. (I have added some emphasis by italics or boldface here and there.)

[Begin Quote]

1) In Moscow even anti-Putin liberals seem to think that the US/EU has pushed too far in Ukraine. For example, last week I had lunch with two Russian professionals. The conversation turned to Ukraine and one of them remarked that US policy seemed driven solely by a desire to “stick it to Russia” (насолить). The leaked conversation between Nuland and Ambassador Pyatt shocked people. It appears to people that the US is encouraging anti-Russian nationalists or sending signals that they could easily misinterpret. At the end, they decided that it was probably more ineptitude than a deliberate effort to cause harm, but I imagine 90% of Russians assume American diplomats understand exactly what they’re doing and the potential consequences. It takes a great deal of sophistication to consider stupidity and incompetence as an explanation.

2) People understand perfectly well why Poles, Balts and some Ukrainians would be anti-Russian. But they don’t understand why this desire to settle historical scores gets so much support from the US.

3) If you read the US press, it’s axiomatic that Crimea and Eastern Ukraine would choose Russia, if given the choice. But I’m hearing it’s not a sure thing, especially in regards to Eastern Ukraine. There people want to keep their jobs and they don’t want their factories shut down in a trade war with Russia, but that doesn’t mean they want to be annexed.

4) People make a sharp distinction between Crimea and other parts of Ukraine. If a referendum does vote in favor of union, most Russians would be happy to take them, irrespective of political leaning.

5) It seems to me that any Russian President, of any political persuasion, would have had his or her hand forced by this meddling.

6) I sometimes think that Americans have benefited from democratic institutions so long (even if they are under assault by the political elite with gerrymandering and anonymous donations), that they don’t grasp the institutional framework that has to be in place for a democratic revolution actually to work. Also, people underestimate how much of this infrastructure is being built in Russia, even though the process is slow and boring. It’s one thing to scream that you want a democracy and the end to corruption; it’s another to organize people in a way that it happens over decades. In that respect, Russia, even under Putin, is far more advanced than Ukraine.

7) The immediate vote to remove the legal status of Russian (as well as other languages) confirmed suspicions that the new Ukrainian parliament is blindly anti-Russian, even though the idea was quickly stopped. It also raises the question of political competence.

8. I was in Donetsk and in Crimea for a Coal Miners’ Conference last spring. At the time I was shocked by the near apocalyptic pessimism of nearly everyone. I thought people were being hyperbolic when they said the political situation was hopeless and the country could split in two.

9) I suspect Putin will come out of this situation stronger, unless it all descends into chaos. It has certainly set back the Russian opposition. People won’t demonstrate, and not just because of fear of the police. It will simply seem unpatriotic and remind everyone of violence in Kiev, which no one wants. Even people who dislike Yanukovich do not like how he was kicked out of office. I think it’s a fair question to ask why elections couldn’t take place as agreed, and why he had to be forced out of office immediately.

10) Putin may well circumscribe civil liberties further. For which we can thank, in part, Poland, Western Ukraine, the EU and Obama.

11) I sometimes suspect that many East Europeans feel they will lose their identity as bulwarks against barbarianism if Russia ever becomes a normal country, so unconsciously they try to stop it. It’s going to be tough for the Poles when they have to go head to head with Russians on culture alone.

[End Quote of the comment from Moscow].

I will be commenting in greater detail on some of these points, but for now will simply say that though I have been a strong admirer and supporter of President Obama, I cannot understand how he could fail to recognize that confronting President Putin publicly on an issue that is so central to Russian national pride and honor, not only tends to have the opposite effect on the issue at hand, but actually strengthens tendencies in Russia that we should wish to discourage. It is as if he, along with his advisers, is living in some alternate ideological and psychological universe.

Russia's New National History Standards

Leon Aron's New Republic article reminded this reader of Lynne Cheney's failed attempt to standardize a pro-American History curriculum during the her chairmanship of the National Endowment for the Humanities. Luckily, it didn't work here--although Cheney-ism under Putin, like Ford-ism under Stalin, seems to have found its truest adherents in the highest levels of the Kremlin:

In fact, the clearest expression of the Kremlin's goodwill toward the textbook came two months earlier, with an invitation to the conference participants to visit President Putin at his residence in Novo-Ogaryovo, outside Moscow. In a long introduction to the discussion that ensued, Putin complained that there was "mishmash" (kasha) in the heads of teachers of history and social sciences, and that this dire situation in the teaching of Russian history needed to be corrected by the introduction of "common standards. " (Four days later, a new law, introduced in the Duma and passed with record speed in eleven days, authorized the ministry of education and science to determine which textbooks be "recommended" for school use and to determine which publishers would print them.) There followed some instructive exchanges:

"A conference participant: In 1990-1991 we disarmed ideologically. [We adopted] a very uncertain, abstract ideology of all-human values. . . . It is as if we were back in school, or even kindergarten. We were told [by the West]: you have rejected communism and are building democracy, and we will judge when and how you have done. . . . In exchange for our disarming ideologically we have received this abstract recipe: you become democrats and capitalists and we will control you.

Putin: Your remark about someone who assumes the posture of teacher and begins to lecture us is of course absolutely correct. But I would like to add that this, undoubtedly, is also an instrument of influencing our country. This is a tried and true trick. If someone from the outside is getting ready to grade us, this means that he arrogates the right to manage [us] and is keen to continue to do so.

Participant: In the past two decades, our youth have been subjected to a torrent of the most diverse information about our historical past. This information [contains] different conceptual approaches, interpretations, or value judgments, and even chronologies. In such circumstances, the teacher is likely to . . .

Putin (interrupting): Oh, they will write, all right. You see, many textbooks are written by those who are paid in foreign grants. And naturally they are dancing the polka ordered by those who pay them. Do you understand? And unfortunately [such textbooks] find their way to schools and colleges."

And later, concluding the session, Putin declared:

"As to some problematic pages in our history--yes, we've had them. But what state hasn't? And we've had fewer of such pages than some other [states]. And ours were not as horrible as those of some others. Yes, we have had some terrible pages: let us remember the events beginning in 1937, let us not forget about them. But other countries have had no less, and even more. In any case, we did not pour chemicals over thousands of kilometers or drop on a small country seven times more bombs than during the entire World War II, as it was in Vietnam, for instance. Nor did we have other black pages, such as Nazism, for instance. All sorts of things happen in the history of every state. And we cannot allow ourselves to be saddled with guilt--they'd better think of themselves."

Gary Kasparov on Vladimir Putin

From Daniel Henninger's profile in the Wall Street Journal:

We made him a contributing editor to the Journal editorial page, and in the years since he has written often for these pages on Russia's wild ride to its current state. Across 16 years, Mr. Kasparov's commitment to democratic liberty in Russia and in its former republics has been unstinting. At that September 1991 lunch, Mr. Kasparov proposed an idea then anathema to elite thinking in Washington and the capitals of Western Europe: The West should announce support for the independence of the former Soviet republics--the Baltics, Ukraine, Armenia, Georgia, Moldova and the rest.

One suspects that Vladimir Putin noticed what the young chess champion was saying in 1991 about the old Soviet empire. The Russian president has famously said, "The demise of the Soviet Union was the greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the century."

Russia today is not what it was. Mr. Kasparov, however, has not stopped analyzing what it has become. Briefly, he argues that Mr. Putin's internal and external politics should be seen almost wholly as a function of oil prices, the primary source of revenue for the Russian state and the prop beneath the extended Putin political family. Mr. Putin's "unhelpful" policies on Iran and the like, Mr. Kasparov argues, keep the oil markets boiling--but not boiling over. Money in the bank, at $94 a barrel. He says Mr. Putin is the glue that binds this fabulously wealthy family, and if he left politics in any real sense they would start killing each other.

Jerusalem Post: Let Crimea Join Russia

http://www.jpost.com/Experts/Enough-with-the-macho-talk-Ukraine-is-better-off-without-Crimea-344882

 Avi Perry writes:

Those who criticize Obama’s handling of the Ukrainian crisis do so for the wrong reasons; they claim that President Putin dared invading Ukraine because he perceived a weak and an indecisive US president.

 

Really?

 

Did Putin perceive President Bush — the one US president who had not hesitated invading two countries, Iraq and Afghanistan, during his first term in office—as weak, when he invaded and occupied parts of Georgia? Was that the reason Putin had committed his troops?

 

Would John McCain, Lindsey Graham, or any GOP presidential hopeful resort to using force against Russia over Putin’s occupation of Crimea? If not, then what’s the purpose of the macho talk other than a fresh, ridiculous excuse for bashing Obama?

 

Would any GOP leader impose harsher sanctions on Russia as punishment for Putin’s misbehavior? Do they even think of the consequences? Do they realize that a subsequent retaliation by Russia could harm the EU and the US where public opinion of those who might get hurt economically matter much more than it does in Putin’s Russia?

 

But let’s stop the insanity when it comes to Crimea. Let’s ask President Obama and Secretary of State John Kerry, to apply to Crimea the same logic they apply to their argument for a two-state solution in the Middle-East.

 

“In the absence of a peaceful two-state solution,” they claim, “Israel has a choice between either being a democracy or preserving its Jewish character, but not both”. In other words, the American logic states that if Israel rules over a Palestinian majority in the West Bank, then either these Palestinians become Israeli citizens with full voting rights, a fact which would undermine the Jewish character of the state, or they become second class citizens, a fact which would undermine the democratic moral fiber of the state.

 

Applying equivalent logic to Ukraine, President Obama should claim that with keeping Crimea as part of Ukraine, Ukraine has a choice between either being a true democracy, but closely allied with Russia, or preserving its freshly-formed pro-western character by dismissing Crimea’s majority and suppressing the will of its people by repealing a law giving regional rights to minority languages, and by signing a new bill banning the use of Russian media, as the recent re-energized Ukrainian leadership has already done.

 

A proper US policy concerning Russia and Ukraine should comprise the toning down of the hostile rhetoric and the macho talk, accept the latest facts on the ground, and only pretend to be upset.

 

This way, the majority of the Crimean population will be happy; Ukraine will be assured of a democratic, pro-western government; relations between Russia and the West will return to calm as tensions will fade away, and the global economy will continue to grow uninterrupted.

Andrew Kuchins on Putin's Missile Offer

From Newsday (ht Johnson's Russia List):

Maybe it is my sunbaked California upbringing that inclines me to think optimistically that Putin is serious, but let me offer a few reasons to support this view. First, I really don't think Putin wants a trashed U.S.-Russian relationship as part of his political legacy. I know Bush does not, and that is a big reason the two of them unexpectedly agreed to schedule the meeting in Maine this summer. But for that meeting to succeed in really turning the momentum in U.S.-Russian relations in a positive direction after a long downturn, something reasonably dramatic needs to be agreed on. Missile defense cooperation would certainly check that box.

Second, we have been discussing sharing missile launch data with the Russians for nearly 15 years, and we did reach an important agreement in 2000 to establish in Moscow a Joint Data Exchange Center, but implementation has been held up for legal and political reasons. Exploring missile defense cooperation was on the agenda for Bush and Putin going back to 2001, but the shift in our focus after 9/11 and other factors put that on the back burner. So there is considerable pre-history here that makes this proposal not entirely "out of the blue."

The obstacles, of course, are considerable. First, the radar in Azerbaijan is not of the technical specifications of the X-Band radar we had planned for the Czech Republic. There are all kinds of technical and legal complications, but the biggest challenges boil down to trust and politics. There is currently inadequate trust among the Russian and American political and military establishments to virtually overnight engage in a degree of cooperation found only among the closest of allies.

Bush and Putin have been saying for years that the Cold War is over; now they have the opportunity to most decisively prove that conclusion.

If they were to muster the political will against all odds, they would do a great deal for international security and their precarious legacies. You can bet that Putin's friends in Tehran and, to a lesser extent, in Beijing are not so comfortable with this turn of events.

Asia Times: Sen. Lugar, Nunn-Lugar, Obama, Putin & Syria

http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle_East/MID-04-110913.html

M K Bhadrakumar writes in the Asia Times:

Now, as a young senator, Obama regarded himself as a protege ("pupil") of Lugar; he had served in the Nunn-Lugar program (which took him on his only visit to Russia before becoming president). 

In fact, the 20th anniversary of the Nunn-Lugar Program was one of the first public functions that Obama attended on December 3 last year after getting re-elected. He made a remarkable speech on that occasion in Washington where he hailed the track record of the Nunn-Lugar "far beyond the old Soviet Union". Obama said, 

Nunn-Lugar is the foundation for the vision that I laid out, once I was elected president, in travel to Prague - where nations come together to secure nuclear materials, as we're doing with our Nuclear Security Summits, where we build on New START and continue to work to reduce our arsenals; where we strengthen the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and prevent the spread of the world's most deadly weapons; where, over time, we come closer to our ultimate vision - a world without nuclear weapons. 

Suffice to say, Putin factors in that disarmament is a key policy agenda for Obama. Putin cannot be oblivious of the potential of the Russian plan on Syria going far beyond the resolution of the immediate conflict situation at hand in the Eastern Mediterranean. 

It could be Syria today that Russia is working on alongside the Obama administration. But it could as well be on Iran tomorrow. And incrementally, Obama also would need to think about addressing Russia's core concerns - missile defense, for instance. 

A paradigm shift 

Working with the Obama administration as "equal partner" has always been Putin's core Russian foreign-policy objective and any constructive cooperation over Syria can possibly change the entire alchemy of Russian-American relations. 

The pro-western Russian elites who dominate policymaking in Moscow whole-heartedly welcome Putin's working relationship with Obama. For the majority of Russian people, at the same time, Putin's brilliant handling of the Syrian crisis has enhanced the country's image and international standing. 

To be sure, an interesting paradigm shift is taking place as the Russian leadership identifies with American public opinion, with which Obama also instinctively empathizes, as his speech on Tuesday revealed.

Haaretz: Putin, Ukraine & Israel

http://www.haaretz.com/news/world/.premium-1.578474

Putin may have lost Ukraine’s Jews but he will always have Israel.

The First Crimean War broke out on March 28, 1854, 160 years ago this month, over attempts by the French Emperor Napoleon III to put French Catholic monks in control of the Church of the Holy Sepulchre in Jerusalem instead of Russian Orthodox priests. The current geopolitical showdown around the peninsula is seemingly not connected to Jerusalem in any way. The strategic alliance with the United States, on the one hand, and the desire not to anger Putin, on the other, mandate Israeli silence over Ukraine. On Wednesday, following American pressure, Foreign Minister Avigdor Lieberman’s personal spokesman issued an anemic statement expressing the hope that the crisis in Ukraine could be solved in a peaceful manner. Not a mention of Russia or Crimea.

And yet, Israel is connected.

A Ukrainian citizen stepping in to the lobby of one of Tel-Aviv’s luxury hotels this week would have been surprised to encounter there a wider array of his country’s political and business elite, many of them meeting senior Israeli officials and businesspeople. In this conflict, Israel has become a safe-haven, a neutral zone where Ukrainians afraid to remain in there homeland can rest their heads. Many of them own homes in western Europe, particularly in London, but while the European Union is discussing the freezing of assets of those close to the old regime, why take the risk? Israel is a few hours flight from Ukraine, there are lots of Russian-speakers and there is no need to worry about any sanctions. Israel won’t take any step that will anger either side, including not condemning Putin’s occupation.

Meanwhile, Israel’s ambassador in Kiev, Reuven Dinel, a former intelligence officer, has been holding quiet meetings with leaders of the parties that toppled president Viktor Yanukovych two weeks ago. The meetings have included the ultra-nationalist parties, which are eager to cleanse themselves of the stain of anti-Semitism that has tainted the entire Maidan revolution, at least in the eyes of the Kremlin-influenced media.

There have been two major crises in the Israel-Putin relationship. The first came in 2006, when Israel accused Russia of having supplied Hezbollah with advanced anti-tank missiles that damaged Israel Defense Forces tanks. The Kremlin initially denied the charge, until Israel sent analyses from the IDF substances laboratory that proved beyond doubt the missiles’ provenance. An Israeli official who took part in the meetings with the Kremlin said the Russians were surprised that the missiles, originally supplied to Syria, had found their way to Lebanon and promised to supervise more closely in the future.

The second crisis came with the outbreak of the Russia-Georgia war in 2008, when weapons systems and training supplied by Israel assisted the small Georgian army in inflicting casualties on the Russian invaders. Putin met President Shimon Peres at the opening of the Beijing Olympic Games and made it clear Russia would not remain silent. The message struck home and the former IDF officers and Israeli security companies working in Georgia were instructed to return home immediately.

Since then, there has been close coordination between Jerusalem and Moscow, manifested among other things in the continued delay of supplies of advanced S300 anti-aircraft missiles to Iran, despite their being paid for. The supervision of Russian weapons in Syria has loosened, especially since the outbreak of the civil war there, but Russian has not reacted to the destruction, ascribed to Israel, of advanced Russian missiles that were about to be handed over to Hezbollah. As long as this coordination remains in place, not a word of criticism will be heard from Israel, no matter what the Russians do in Crimea.

Meet the Pres

That's not what they called Russian president Vladimir Putin's 3-hour TV call-in show, (they could also have called it "live from the Kremlin"), but it's as good a title as any. We don't have anything like it here--and I don't think Bush could answer questions for three hours on C-SPAN (Clinton or Reagan probably could). The news was that Putin is giving a raise to government employees, as well as increasing pensions and benefits. This is the fallout from the "Babushka Revolution" of last winter that shut down Moscow and St. Petersburg in protest over pension monetization schemes that would have cost the elderly their remaining perks and privileges. Now, Putin is shelling out an addtional $4 billion. Not much by Katrina standards, but for Russia, that's a lot of rubles (120 billion rubles sounds like more). The US press and liberal critics are complaining that the questions were screened, but from what I can tell, it sounds like Putin took some difficult ones, not only about hot-button pension and salary issues, but also about Chechnya. He also announced he won't seek a third term as president, but would stay active. Who knows what that means, whether a power behind the throne or a Clinton-style international hob-nobber. My guess is that he hasn't decided exactly what comes next, it depends on the next three years and how they go. What Russia does with its oil money is key. If he can begin to build up the high-tech sectors, and perhaps set up some more manufacturing industries, Russia might be able to follow China's economic path. There are a lot of "ifs" though. So the only thing one can say for sure is that the Putin TV talk show suggests that if all else fails, Putin can do a Vladimir Pozner, and host his own television talk show. I wonder if he's thought of that already?

UPDATE: The Kremlin has posted an English transcript here.

Putin Endorses Bush

Reports The Washington Post:

"Yet if the choice in the U.S. elections comes down to Bush the unilateralist vs. Kerry the alliance builder, Russia will still take the unilateralist. President Vladimir Putin has repeatedly made his preference clear in recent months. Even though he too opposed the invasion of Iraq, Putin last summer insisted that Democrats had no right to criticize President Bush, since the Clinton administration had done essentially the same in Yugoslavia. When Democrats bashed Bush for exaggerating Iraqi connections to terrorism, Putin volunteered that Russian intelligence had warned Washington that Saddam Hussein was planning terrorist attacks against the United States.

"And just last week, as if reading from the Bush-Cheney campaign Web site, Putin declared that terrorists in Iraq were rooting for John F. Kerry. "The goal of international terrorism is to prevent the election of President Bush to a second term," Putin told a news conference in Tajikistan."

Putin's Zubkov Gambit

Nabi Abdullaev reports in the Moscow Times on the meaning of Putin's choice of Russia's new prime minister, Viktor Zubkov:

Olga Kryshtanovskaya, who tracks Kremlin politics at the Russian Academy of Sciences, said Zubkov had already become the frontrunner, surpassing acting First Prime Ministers Sergei Ivanov and Dmitry Medvedev, who have been intensely groomed for months as potential presidential successors.

Putin might be opting for a scenario in which he would not anoint a single successor to avoid charges of trampling on democratic procedures, but instead would offer voters the choice between three or four loyal followers instead, said Sergei Mikheyev, of the Center for Political Technologies.

"And it is possible that after eight years of an active and relatively young Putin, Russia's cautious voters would prefer aged and conservative Zubkov over the younger and dynamic Medvedev and Ivanov," said Dmitry Orlov, an analyst at the Agency for Political and Economic Communications. "Dispersing support behind such different candidates would be rational for Putin at the moment."

Interestingly, this took place shortly after a meeting of the Valdai discussion club, a group of international opinion leaders who get together with the Russian president from time-to-time to discuss Russia's role in global affairs. At the meeting, CSIS expert Andrew Kuchins questioned Putin about growing anti-Americanism in Russia:

ANDREW KUCHINS: ...I want to ask you a question about Russian-American relations. I am worried about our relations and their long-term development prospects. I had the opportunity to meet with President Bush. Marshall Goldman and several others were also there. I know that President Bush is worried about the increase of anti-Americanism in Russia and especially among young people. Of course, anti-Americanism is increasing in many countries in the world.

I lived in Moscow for two and a half years and when I came back to the States at the end of last year I was also very upset with the biased and negative image that Russia has in the American media.

But my question refers to the representation of the USA in Russian media, especially on Russian national television. When I lived here for two and a half years I often watched television and it left a strong impression on me. If Russian national television had been my only source of information I would have concluded that the USA is a hostile country and perhaps even an enemy.

But I know that this is not your policy and that you support improving our relations and making them more constructive. And during our meeting I told our President this in a very frank and direct way.

But it seems to me that there is a certain contradiction between the image of the USA as presented on Russian television and Russia’s foreign policy. Can you explain to me why this exists and how we can correct or improve the situation?

VLADIMIR PUTIN: I can. The media reflects the realities of the present life and mood of Russian society. And independently of whether or not the media is state-owned or independent, if it doesn’t reflect society’s mood then it will not be interesting and people won’t trust the media. And they say what people want to hear. The media reflects real life. And the Russian government’s foreign policy is pragmatic and designed to improve Russian-American relations.

While the press does not need to look at the future of international relations, international life and Russian-American relations it is part of my task to do so. For that reason there is really a marked difference between the mood among society, in the media and our concrete policies. I am only chagrined and confused by those who, unlike you, sometimes pretend not to notice the fact that we are increasing our efforts to not only maintain but also to improve Russian-American relations.

I think that our colleagues’ main problem is that they are not inclined to search for compromises. They almost always insist that we accept certain decisions that they consider optimal. But of course this does not happen 100 percent of the time. Sometimes we engage in joint work and in these cases, as a rule, we are able to achieve viable results.

I would very much like for this practice to take hold in our relations with our American partners. This will only happen in the event that they acknowledge our national interests and take them into consideration.

I repeat that we don’t intend to work against American interests, nor do we intend to neglect our own interests in favour of our partners’ interests.

I repeat that this work will be effective if they acknowledge our national interests.

We have really developed very good relations with President Bush. And without any undue exaggeration I think that this is a very important factor in intergovernmental relations. Recently this element became even more obvious because there are a lot of various small problems. In any case, we value this. It seems to me that President Bush also values this. We shall continue to rely on this in the future. And of course we are going to expand this base.

For instance, in accordance with American legislation we wanted to conclude contracts with various lobbying groups that officially operate in Congress. You know what they told us? And this is normal, this is in accordance with American laws. But the people we contacted told us that state department employees did not support such relations with Russian partners. That is strange. It is true that in direct dialogue with our American colleagues they did not admit this. They said: ‘No, that can’t be true, we did not do this’. But this means that someone – either the representatives of the lobbies or of the state department – is giving us the wrong information.

But such trifles prevent us from establishing a constructive dialogue. Why should this be possible for all other countries and not for Russia? We are not doing this underground, with the help of the FSB or the Foreign Intelligence Service. We are doing this openly and as it should be done with a view to engaging in a meaningful dialogue with legislators. What is wrong here? They say: ‘No, that is not possible’. Why is it impossible? It is a trifle, a detail. It is simply evidence of how they automatically applied the presumption of the Soviet Union’s guilt to Russia. This is not right, it is harmful and it bothers us.

For example, I believe that Europe will grow to become a political entity and that European statehood will be strengthened, and that both will inevitably occur because they are product of life’s basic needs and global economic development. During these processes political forces in the United States that are interested in the existence of a strong viable Russia and in developing intergovernmental ties will also grow. We will put emphasis on precisely this part of American society and of the American political establishment.

Thank you.

The Russia Card is America's Trump Card

Opponents of President Trump have forced the resignation of General Mike Flynn as President Trump's National Security Advisor--by playing the Russia Card.

It is the second time Russian connections have led to a resignation of a top Trump official, since Russian intrigues brought down Paul Manafort as campaign chairman shortly after Trump had secured the Republican nomination for President.

It looks like history has repeated itself.

However, the Russia Card cannot be understood out of context. In fact, the Russia Card is about more than Russia--for it is also the flip side of the Muslim Card, which Trump deployed against Hillary Clinton and President Obama.

Interestingly, Russophobes also tend to oppose Trump's travel ban, "extreme vetting," and efforts to add the Muslim Brotherhood to the list of terrorist organizations. Likewise, they expressed little public objection to the foreign connections Huma Abedin, whose parents were active in the Muslim Brotherhood, and had alleged links to Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, serving as a top aide to Presidential candidate Hillary Clinton, nor to the Clinton Foundations ties to repressive Islamist regimes. Nor did they object when the so-called "Arab Spring" installed Islamist governments in the Middle East.

This is not a double standard, because it is a single standard, indeed an Islamist standard--because Russia has been at war with Islamic fundamentalists since at least the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979. Although Islam is one of the officially recognized religions of Russia, some would say the history of Russia has been one of confrontation with Islam since the conquest of Persia in 651. In the 19th Century Tolstoy wrote about fighting Chechens in Haji Murad. They are still fighting Chechens today.

Islamist supporters play the Russian Card like this: Unable to directly defend Islamic terrorism, ISIS, or unlimited Muslim immigration to the United States, they choose to attack Russia to achieve the same ends, playing on ancient--and I believe obsolete and inappropriate--grievances.

They take advantage of lingering resentments among Republicans who are still anti-Russian because Russia was once Communist. When these Republicans see Putin, they see him a Communist commissar, a former KGB officer,  a "thug." When they see Russia, they see it as if it were still the Soviet Union--even though Russia voluntarily withdrew from its former Soviet satellites, allowed some of them to join the EU, and dissolved the USSR.

On the other side, leftist Democrats have lingering resentments that Russia rejected Communism. They are as strongly hostile to Putin as Stalin was anti-Trotsky. When they look at Putin, they see a turncoat KGB agent who sold out to capitalism, suppresses LGBT causes on behalf of Russian Orthodoxy, and who encourages the very Russian nationalism that the USSR suppressed with its "Friendship of Peoples" doctrine (Soviet multiculturalism), therefore another kind of "thug" (like Cuba calls its refugees from Communism "gusanos"--worms).

As a result Russia experiences significant enmity from both the Right and the Left sides of the American political spectrum.

Similarly, Right-wingers don't credit Russia for its support of American troops in Afghanistan, for Putin's crushing the Communist Party, or for co-operation in fighting terror--including unheeded warnings about the Boston Marathon bombers. And Left-wingers don't care that Russia enjoys good relations with China or Cuba.

Additionally, since 9/11 American strategic planners have been unwilling to undertake a full alliance with Russia against Islamist fundamentalism because of objections from Arab Gulf states, and European allies in NATO are suspicious of Russian designs in Europe.

Compounding the problem has been the taboo on public discussion of Islamist terrorism in both Europe and the United States (there is no such taboo in Russia). Since discussion of the actual enemy has been repressed, it is my belief that anti-Russian sentiments have actually been symptoms of psychological displacement--unable to criticize the actual enemies of the United States, the public has been licensed to oppose imaginary enemies, such as Russia, "Global Climate Change," Israel, and "White Privilege."

Exacerbating this phenomenon has been a US foreign policy that is totally unsuited to the dangers facing the country since the fall of the Berlin Wall. Instead of crushing Islamic extremism, America has chosen to pursue essentially an updated version of Britain's 19th Century "Great Game" in the Middle East and Central Asia, attempting to reduce Russian influence, including in Afghanistan, once a Soviet satellite, and Iraq, once a Soviet ally. Seen in that context, wars in the former Yugoslavia, Ukraine, Libya, Syria, the 'Stans of Central Asia, have privileged Islam in order to undermine Russian interests.

Unfortunately, America's strategic planners failed to realize that after the end of Communism, Russia's enemies were also America's foes. They wished to "divide and rule" by setting Russia against the United States, in order to establish an Islamic Caliphate in the contested zones.

This remarkably successful policy has led a number of previously pro-American nations to turn back to Russia for protection and support--including a number of former Soviet nations in Europe as well as Egypt, most recently. Turkey may well be joining them, unless American policy shifts dramatically--endangering NATO itself. Ironically, Britain had supported the Ottoman Empire, the "sick man of Europe," as a bulwark against Russian expansion during the 19th Century.

Today it would appear that good relations with Russia could change the dynamic of international relations in our favor, given the manifest failures of America's pro-Islamist foreign policy. With Russia as a full and equal partner in American foreign policy, the West could make short work of Islamic terror. Russia has a proven track record of success, little discussed in the USA--in Chechnya, of all places, where Putin ground Islamists to dust on the orders of Boris Yeltsin. The same sort of Russian tactics are working in Syria...just as they worked against Hitler during World War II.

That is why the Russia Card is the flip side of the Muslim Card. Attacks on Russia are support for ISIS. There is no "Third Way." There are no "Syrian Moderates." Putin is no more of a thug than American allies such as the King of Saudi Arabia, the so-called "Syrian oppostion," or the leaders of Iran who signed a deal with President Obama. Indeed, one could make the case that he is far more civilized.

While General Flynn's resignation is his own fault,  he is also a casualty of the Great Game between Islam and the West, in which Russia has played and will continue play a central historical role. No victory in this struggle is possible without Russian support. Flynn realized this, and so must any successor.

It is clear from the failure of American policies since 9/11 that only a full alliance with Russia can defeat Islamic terrorism. So after Flynn's resignation, it has become crystal clear that America is at a crossroads:

We must accept Russia as an ally in the struggle against Islamic terrorism, or surrender to an Islamic Caliphate.

Bottom line: the Russia Card is in fact America's Trump Card.
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