There's another factor to consider--the basic threat of spreading separatism even farther around the world. Russia is threatening not only to stir up secessionist sentiment in places like Georgia's Abkhazia and South Ossetia, but also--reading between the lines--rekindling struggles for places like Corsica, Euskadi (Basque country), and who knows, perhaps Northern Ireland. Candad (Quebec Liberation Front) and Latin America (remember Puerto Rican separatism?)...
Markedonov's plea to set up agreed-upon conditions for secession and self-determination among the great powers should not be dismissed, as it provides a welcome "time-out" from a showdown that may end up no better than the results of US-EU policies to date in Afganistan, Iraq, Lebanon, Sri Lanka, Timor, or the Palestinian Authority:
The first criterion for recognizing self-proclaimed entities could be their validity as a state. Why doesn't the international community rush with Kosovo's recognition? The reason is quite pragmatic. It is not because of Orthodox Serbs, but because state governance there has been replaced with the clan system.The unilateral moment is clearly over, and it would be a mistake to assume that the US can bluff its way through, or bully Russia and China. Let's not be afraid to negotiate. As Churchill famously said in another context: "Jaw-Jaw is better than War-War..."
The second criterion could be a mother country's ability to control a breakaway territory by any means other than deportation and ethnic cleansings. What, apart from the "broad autonomy" rhetoric, can Georgia give to Abkhazia and South Ossetia, and Azerbaijan to Karabakh? After all, if these territories are re-integrated, Azerbaijan will get Armenians as its new citizens, while Georgia will receive Ossetians, Abkhazes, Armenians and Russians. In other words, re-integration should be assumed impossible if it can lead to a military conflict.
The third criterion could be the existence of democratic procedures in self-proclaimed states.
The fourth one - real (not Kosovo-like) guarantees of ethnic minorities' rights, secured by law and in real life.
And, the fifth could be the establishment of bilateral economic, diplomatic and other relations between a mother country and a breakaway territory.
Only by setting clear criteria for recognizing self-proclaimed territories will the international community be able to break the Kosovo deadlock and prevent (or, at least, minimize) the possibility of emerging similar precedents somewhere in Europe or Eurasia.