What the Russian-Georgian War Means

Rein Mullerson explains why the Chinese may be the winners, on OpenDemocracy.net:

By formally recognising the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, Russia acted as rashly as those western states which recognised Kosovo; both sides thus further opened the Pandora's box of territorial disputes. The Kremlin's decision involved two big mistakes. First, Moscow cannot now expect support from many of the states which otherwise would have understood or even welcomed Russia's grandstanding against Nato. China, India and a host of other states are extremely nervous about any encouragement their "own" minorities may have for independence claims.

In this light, vacuous claims by some politicians that the recognition of new states - Kosovo, Abkhazia and South Ossetia for example - is both completely different in each case and doesn't create precedents are wrong in the Caucasus and the Balkans alike. Differences, or parallels for that matter, are in the eye of the beholder. The tepid support given to Russia at the summit of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) in Bishkek only proves that, if any proof was needed.

Second, having recognised these entities the Kremlin has played its trump- cards. It would have been in Russia's interest to keep these cards close, threaten to use them, but never actually throw them on the table. This may sound rather Machiavellian but it is both a better and a more honest assessment of the situation than believing in the crocodile-tears the Kremlin is shedding over the plight of the Ossetians or Abkhazians or Washington over the fate of the Georgians or Ukrainians.

What is needed now is that all the sides have to tone down the rhetoric. After that, small practical steps may be beneficial. Russia's actions have to be reciprocated by the west. It is clear that Nato cannot immediately revert over its policy of enlargement to Georgia and Ukraine. However, putting brakes on this process instead of precipitating it would be wise. Russia understands that it doesn't need these breakaway republics; what it needs is a friendly Georgia. However, such a Georgia can evolve only if Washington ceases to use this country for the purpose of encirclement and containment of Russia.

In facing global challenges Russia - even one that pursues her own interests, which sometimes inevitably differ from western preferences - is a much more important partner for the west than Georgia. This is especially true if the global "war on terror" were indeed one of the most crucial issues. Georgia, or Ukraine for that matter, are more important partners than Russia only if Russia is seen as an enemy (or at least a potential one) and not as a partner (at least a potential one).

This in no way means that the west has to sacrifice these or other small, states for the sake of the partnership with Russia. These nations would only benefit from cooperative relationships between Russia and western democracies as well as from their own cooperation with both Russia and the west. To force or encourage smaller Russian neighbours to take sides - you are either with us or against us - is a policy that is highly detrimental for such states. Moreover, it doesn't matter whether the culprit is Russia (which too actively supports so-called pro-Russian politicians) or the west (which sponsors pro-western leaders). In either case, the people suffer even if their leaders may flourish.

As one of the immediate measures, Georgia should be persuaded to sign "non-use-of-force" agreements with its breakaway territories. Later, other cooperative steps may be possible. If Georgia is ever to regain its these territories it would be only through establishing lasting friendly relations with Russia. Neither will not happen soon. Therefore, patience is needed. Here, once again, more may be learned from the Chinese than from the Georgians, Russians or Americans.