One of the lessons of Iraq surely is that a prolonged sanctions regime will destroy civil society and empower the worst elements of the country, those who thrive in such a gangland atmosphere. If the purpose of sanctions is to bring about a better system for that country, devastating its society is a strange path to the new order. Burma is a particularly complicated place for such an experiment because it is riven with ethnic divisions and conflict. The Burmese government has been fighting 17 ethnic rebel groups for more than 50 years. Many of the rebels now control territory and run their own drug and resource cartels. The country is a failed state waiting to happen. Its one functioning national institution is the Army. Bringing liberal democracy to the country is going to be a challenge anyhow, and it is being made more difficult by the evisceration of its society.
In the early 1990s, after refusing to accept the results of an election in which Suu Kyi won, the Burmese regime began—haltingly—to open up the economy. But Western sanctions quickly put an end to such moves. Thant Myint-U, a former senior U.N. official and author of "The River of Lost Footsteps," a wonderful and affectionate portrait of Burma, argues that had that process of trade, travel and investment been encouraged, "Burma today would look more like Vietnam. It would have many more connections with the world, much more economic and social activity, and the regime would be far more constrained and reluctant to use force or engage in crackdowns."
The other effect of sanctions has been that American firms have mostly been replaced by Chinese companies. (This is precisely what's happened on a larger scale in Sudan, where American firms discovered and built the country's oilfields, then had to abandon them because of the worsening human-rights situation, and now find that the fields have been picked up by Chinese state oil companies.) And while it is perfectly fair to blame Beijing for supporting a dictatorial regime, the Indians, the Thais, the Malaysians and others have also been happy to step into the vacuum in Burma. Is this a net gain for America, for Burma and for human rights?
Thant, who has a celebrated pedigree in Burma—he is the only grandson of U Thant, the third secretary-general of the United Nations—hopes for sustained diplomatic pressure to get the regime to begin a process of real reform, involving the United States, China and India. "If the three countries can reach some consensus, that's the only outside pressure that is likely to matter," he says. "America can still play a crucial role. What the Burmese really want—if they had a choice—is not to be another province of China. They aspire to be a proud, independent country. There are many people there, even in the regime, who want to have good relations with America and the West. But my fear is that the West, momentarily aroused, will reflexively impose new sanctions and then move on. The result will be that the West's role in Burma will decline even more, China's will rise, and Burma will be further away from a liberal democratic future."
“This is slavery, not to speak one's thought.” ― Euripides, The Phoenician Women
Monday, October 08, 2007
Fareed Zakaria on Burma
Zakaria cites Thant Myint-U's policy advice, in Newsweek: